摘要: This paper investigates the impact of timing on the sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. The market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste to the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex-ante acquisition) or after (ex-post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition, which vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex-ante acquisition is the dominant option, as it not only facilities a seller to design the proper product but also to craft pricing strategy better. In contrast, with competition information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition. This subsequently makes the effect of acquisition detrimental and a seller's payoff is non-monotonic in his acquisition cost. Moreover, compared to the ex-ante acquisition, ex-post acquisition normally gives rise to the higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the acquisition timing and maintaining the product differentiation. Nonetheless, this also gives the seller a higher incentive of acquisition and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex-ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of acquisition and the timing flexibility can be both detrimental and irresistible.

　　关键词: information acquisition; acquisition timing; horizontal competition; game theory

　　本文刊登于Naval Research Logistics，卷:63期:1页:3-22 (lead article)。 Naval Research Logistics为永利官网A-类期刊。

　　关旭为该文第一作者&通讯作者。